Securitizing tobacco settlements: the basics, the benefits, the risks by E. Matthew Quigley
n this time of fiscal hardship for American states,
governors and legislators across the country are
searching for ways to make up for revenue short-
falls. Partly because of the severity of the revenue
crisis, innovative and unconventional means of raising
cash have begun to surface. One of these approaches, the
topic of this article, is the securitization of tobacco settle-
ment revenues. 
The Tobacco Settlement 
In November 1998, the attorneys general of 46
states, including the six in New England, signed a Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA) with companies represent-
ing roughly 98 percent of the current tobacco industry.
Among other provisions, the MSA provides for a signing
bonus that was paid to the states in 1999 and specifies
that a share of tobacco company profits is to be paid in
perpetuity to the signatory states. In 1999 dollars, this
stream of revenues was estimated to be worth roughly
$306 billion for the first 25 years of the agreement. For
the six New England states, Table 1 details the upfront
payments, average annual payments in perpetuity, and
total value of the tobacco settlement payments, all in
1999 dollars.
States have put these funds to a variety of uses. In
New England, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Vermont have invested them in trust funds. New
Hampshire has used its settlement funds to provide sup-
plemental education funding. Rhode Island, initially
treating the money as general fund revenue, has joined a
growing number of states that have securitized their set-
tlement revenue streams. 
What Is Securitization?
In the case of tobacco settlements, securitization is the
process of issuing bonds backed by tobacco settlement
revenues. Through the sales of bonds, states pledge their
right to collect future revenue streams in exchange for an
upfront lump-sum payment.
Although these transactions
can take many different forms,
states tend to sell or pledge
their tobacco revenue streams
to a Special Purpose Entity
(SPE) established by the state
legislature for the express pur-
pose of selling tobacco-rev-
enue-backed bonds and servic-
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I
Tobacco Settlement Payments 
Table 1
Connecticut  $45 million  $141 million  $ 5.7 billion
Maine  18 million  59 million  2.4 billion
Massachusetts  97 million  307 million  12.3 billion
New Hampshire  16 million  51 million  2.0 billion
Rhode Island  17 million  55 million  2.2 billion





over First 25 
Yearsing the debt. These SPEs are designed to be both bankruptcy proof and legally separate from the
state. As a result, the state does not put its own credit rating at risk through the issuance of a
tobacco bond.1 A list of securitizations to date is provided in Table 2.
Structuring Securitizations 
Depending upon the intended use of the funds raised through securitization, tobacco bonds
can be either taxable or tax-exempt. Generally speaking, if the proceeds from a bond sale will be
used for governmental purposes (e.g., funding an infrastructure need), then the bonds are tax-
exempt. If, however, the proceeds will be used for a private purpose or will be reinvested (e.g.,
used to endow a pension fund), then the bonds are taxable. There are costs and benefits to the
states associated with either option. States have more flexibility in spending the proceeds of tax-
able bonds. However, because they carry a higher interest rate than tax-exempt bonds, taxables
raise interest costs to the state and, therefore, reduce present value. Conversely, tax-exempt bonds,
while more restrictive on uses of proceeds, have lower interest costs.
After choosing between these two options, states face decisions on three main structural
issues: amortization structure, the term or final maturity of the debt, and the percentage of tobac-
co settlement revenues to be securitized. Amortization structures can be residual or turbo. A
residual structure allows the bond issuer to receive any tobacco settlement revenues above the
planned debt service, so-called “residual payments.” In other words, if tobacco settlement rev-
enues are larger than expected in any given year, the issuer
retains the difference between the actual revenues received
and the planned debt service payment on the tobacco bonds.
This structure allows the issuer to retain the upside potential
associated with tobacco settlement revenues while at the
same time transferring the downside potential (i.e., declines
in revenues) to bondholders.
A residual structure also includes so-called “trapping
events” that mandate a deposit of all residual payments into a
“trapping account.” Typical trapping events include an
increase in the market share of non-MSA participating man-
ufacturers or a drop in cigarette consumption below certain
specified levels. Under these types of circumstances, residuals
are accumulated in a trapping account up to a pre-specified
level, thereby ensuring an additional level of security to bond-
holders. Only after trapping requirements are met do residu-
als flow through to the issuing state.
Under a turbo structure, all available tobacco settlement
revenues are used to amortize tobacco bonds before the issuer
can receive any residual cash flows. In other words, all revenues are “trapped” and used to amor-
tize the debt as quickly as possible right from the issuance of the bonds. Largely because of this,
investors view a “turboized” structure positively. From the state’s perspective, a turbo amortiza-
tion has the advantage of retiring debt more quickly. On the downside, a turbo transfers less long-
term tobacco industry risk to bondholders than does a residual structure. 
In addition to determining the best amortization structure, states contemplating securitiza-
tion must also decide which term or maturity date best fits their needs. The nearer the final matu-
rity date of the bond (i.e., the point in time at which final payments are made to bondholders),
the less total interest that the state has to pay to bondholders. Thus, a bond with a short matu-
rity period may make sense to a state wanting to amortize its principal quickly. This involves a
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debt more quickly. 
On the downside, a
turbo transfers less
long-term tobacco
industry risk to bond-
holders than does a
residual structure. 
1 Although the state’s credit rating is not directly at risk, some risk remains. If projected tobacco settlement revenues diminish
below levels necessary to provide adequate debt service, it is possible, although perhaps not likely, that bondholders could com-
pel the state to repay bondholders. Additionally, coupled with other indicators, the sale of tobacco bonds for deficit financing may
adversely affect a state’s overall credit rating.
Ttradeoff, however. Tobacco revenue streams are more
secure in the near term than they are in the long term.
Therefore, revenue stream risks borne by the states are
further mitigated the longer the term of the bond. 
Finally, states can securitize different percentages of
their tobacco settlement revenues. Regardless of the
amortization structure chosen, securitized revenues are
irrevocably dedicated to debt service. Unsecuritized
tobacco settlement revenues can be used for whatever
purpose the state deems necessary.
Potential Benefits of Securitization
Securitization, as previously mentioned, allows states
to receive sizable funds today rather than smaller pay-
ments spread out over many years. For states facing
immediate fiscal needs, an upfront infusion of cash may
have more utility than a future revenue stream.
Securitization also transfers risks from the state to the
capital markets; such risks include the possibility that the
tobacco companies will go bankrupt or move overseas,
that consumption patterns will change, or that the settle-
ment will be successfully challenged in court by nonpar-
ticipating tobacco firms. States may diversify their risk by
investing the bond proceeds in a variety of uses (e.g.,
endowing health care or pension funds), so that revenues
are not overly dependent on one industry. In a similar
vein, securitization limits a state’s association with the
tobacco industry, an association perceived as undesirable
by some elements of the public. Finally, by using securi-
tization proceeds to fund capital projects or defease exist-
ing debt, a state can free up general revenue funds for a
variety of purposes. It is possible that defeasance of exist-
ing debt could positively affect the overall credit rating of
a state with a pre-existing heavy debt burden.
Potential Drawbacks of Securitization
Despite the aforementioned benefits of securitization,
it also has disadvantages. First, the high discount (in most
cases, tobacco settlement bonds have sold for between 50
cents and 54 cents on the dollar) or high interest rate
makes the bonds potentially expensive and results in
lower net income over the life of the settlement. Second,
there may be a limited market for tobacco bonds.
Although no evidence of market saturation has yet sur-
faced, some believe that a saturation point will be reached
in the market for tobacco revenue bonds, beyond which
states will realize fewer gains with greater costs. Third, if
future payment streams diminish to the point where they
are insufficient to cover debt service, a state could face
pressure to back the bonds with general revenue. Finally,
“inappropriate” use of bond proceeds (e.g., using pro-
ceeds to close a budget gap without addressing the under-
lying structural causes) could adversely affect a state’s
overall credit rating.











Alabama   50.0   Aa1   A   NR   09/21/00   See Note 1   1   Economic development
Alaska   116.0   Aa3   A   A+   10/26/00   40   8   Education; infrastructure
South Carolina   934.5   Aa3/A1   A   A+   03/22/01   100   17   Health care; community development;
                water infrastructure; tobacco    
               farmer  assistance
Alaska II   126.8   Aa3   A   A+   08/15/01   40   11   Education; infrastructure
Arkansas   60.0   Aa2   NR   NR   09/25/01   See Note 1   2   Capital projects
Iowa   644.2   Aa3/A1   A   NR   10/25/01   78   12   Capital projects; health care trust
               fund  endowment
Louisiana   1,202.8   Aa3/A1   A   A+   11/07/01   60   19   Education and health care trust fund 
                endowment; local aid to schools; 
               liquidity  reserve
Alabama II   103.8   Aa1   A   NR   12/20/01   See Note 1   2   Economic development
Wisconsin   1,600   A1   A   A+   05/23/02   100   16   Cover deficit
Rhode Island   685.4   A1   A   A+   06/27/02   100   27   Debt defeasance; cover deficit
New Jersey   1,801.5   A1   A   A+   08/28/02   50   8   Unrestricted general fund use
South Dakota   278.0   Aa3/A1   A   NR   09/24/02   100   33  Education












Structure of Bonds Use of Bond Proceeds
Tobacco Securitizations as of November 2002 
Note 1: Because of peculiarities in the manner in which Alabama and Arkansas securitized their receivables, it was not possible to make estimates of this percentage 
for these two states comparable to estimates made for the other states.
Note 2: Bond proceeds as a percent of fiscal year revenues = (bond proceeds received by the issuing state) – (total revenues received by the issuing state during 
the year in which the bonds were issued).         
Source: Moody's Investors Service, Standard & Poor's, Fitch Ratings.
. .Conclusions and Outlook 
What would securitization mean for each of the New
England states? 
Connecticut and Massachusetts, given the enormity
of their budget problems and the substantial size of their
tobacco settlement revenue streams, stand to enjoy the
highest potential benefits from securitization. Maine,
New Hampshire, and Vermont are in a situation similar
to that of Rhode Island (see box).
Connecticut ended the first year of its biennial budg-
et cycle with a deficit of $817 million. The legislature
reduced the deficit by transferring the $595 million bal-
ance of the state’s rainy day fund into the general fund.
The remaining deficit of $222 million was carried over
into the current fiscal year and will be closed through the
issuance of economic recovery notes. Officials project
that an additional $415 million shortfall will materialize
during the current fiscal year. If the state were to securi-
tize its entire settlement, it could raise approximately
$1.5 billion to $1.7 billion – more than three times the
expected FY2003 shortfall – assuming discount and
transaction costs similar to those of states that have
already securitized.
For the first three years of the MSA, Massachusetts
“banked” 70 percent of its payment into a Medicaid
Security Trust Fund and devoted 30 percent to the state’s
general fund. As fiscal conditions worsened in
FY2001/2002, “banking” was abandoned, and 100 per-
cent of tobacco settlement revenues were, and currently
are, diverted to general fund expenditures. If
Massachusetts were to securitize 100 percent of its tobac-
co settlement revenues, it could expect to realize a lump-
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New England Economic Indicators, January 2003
The January 2003 issue of New England Economic Indicators features an article by E. Matthew
Quigley on the fiscal condition of the New England states, based on data available through fall 2002.
The article updates an article by Robert Tannenwald on the same topic that appeared in the June 1999
issue of Indicators.  The current article documents the about-face in state finances that has taken place
since the earlier analysis. Charts show changes in revenue collections, patterns in revenues and spend-
ing, changes in budget stabilization fund balances, and budget surpluses or deficits in relation to gen-
eral fund spending.
New England Economic Indicators contains data and analysis on the New England economy and is
produced as a resource for researchers and members of the public. The January issue of New England
Economic Indicators and back issues are available online at:   
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/neei/neei.htm
Subscriptions to New England Economic Indicators and copies of the January issue are available with-
out charge.  Contact the Boston Fed's Research Library:
Research Library - D
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
600 Atlantic Avenue
Boston, MA  02210
e-mail: boston.library@bos.frb.org
An Update: 
The Fiscal Condition of the New England Statessum payment of about $4 billion, roughly double the size
of the expected revenue shortfall for FY2004. If the
Commonwealth were to securitize the 30 percent that it
had previously earmarked for expenditure, it could realize
approximately $1 billion, or 50 percent of the expected
deficit. This second option would allow the
Commonwealth to reestablish its guideline of earmarking
70 percent of settlement revenues to shore up Medicaid. 
The net present value of Maine’s settlement revenue
stream is approximately $1.5 billion. Securitization of the
entire amount would yield approximately $625 million.
Subtracting transaction costs of approximately 20 per-
cent, or $125 million, would yield $500 million in avail-
able funds. This figure is roughly double the size of  the
$243 million revenue shortfall predicted for Maine’s
FY2002-2003 biennial budget cycle. Although lawmak-
ers have publicly considered the idea, no proposal for
securitization has, to date, been introduced. 
New Hampshire and Vermont are the states least like-
ly to securitize. Michael Ablowich, commissioner of New
Hampshire’s Department of the Treasury, is unaware of
any pending proposals to securitize, and state finance
experts have been skeptical of its utility. Vermont officials
are similarly skeptical. In 1999, the Vermont state treas-
urer recommended against securitization, citing high
transaction costs and the relatively small lump-sum pay-
ment that it would produce. Currently, no proposals to
securitize are under consideration. 
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Case Study: Rhode Island
To date, Rhode Island is the only New England
state to have securitized its tobacco settlement funds.
On June 20, 2002, the state’s newly created Tobacco
Settlement Financing Corporation sold its right to
collect $1.2 billion in tobacco settlement proceeds
over the next 20




and $35.7 million in
taxable bonds). The
bonds have a 20-year









reserves, and discounts for the purchasers, including
$55.6 million set aside to finance the first annual pay-
ment to bondholders. Part of the bonds’ proceeds had
to be used for this purpose because the state had
already channeled its most recent tobacco payment
into its general fund. The remaining $487.6 million
– 79 percent of total funds raised – is available for
general appropriation. The state used $295.3 million




ing itself of $343.5








used to close the
state’s FY2002
budget gap; $77.3
million was set aside
as a contingency fund for FY2003; and $35.6 million
is to be carried over into FY2004, also to serve as a
hedge against possible revenue shortfalls. 
Rhode Island’s Use of Proceeds 
from Securitization 
1%
Issuance Cost
8%
One-time Payment
to Investors
12%
Reserves and Discounts
20%
FY2002 Budget Gap
11%
FY2003 Budget Gap
5%
FY2004 Budget Gap
43%
Defeasance of
Existing Debt
FF